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Introduction

Over the past few decades a number of influential studies have sounded
loud warnings regarding overexploitation of natural resources, fast population growth and environmental degradation (see for example Meadows et.al.
(1972) and Elrich and Elrich (1976)). Although the continuously increasing
consumption has been met by increased use of raw material, confounding
most of the catastrophic predictions of these studies, it is undisputable that
increased consumption placed huge pressure on specific resources and most
importantly environmental services. During the twentieth century, as reported in Arrow et al. (2004), world population grew by a factor of 4,
industrial output increased by a factor of 40, energy use has increased by
a factor of 16, annual fish harvesting by a multiple of 35 and carbon and
sulfur dioxide emissions by a factor of 10.
Furthermore, Arrow et al. (2004) provide evidence, admittedly not conclusive, supporting the view that consumption’s share of output is likely to
be higher than that which is prescribed by the "maximize present value"
criterion. Increased consumption in the poorest parts of the world has a
positive impact by improving living conditions. On the other hand, overconsumption in the developed world is far less justifiable. An answer to
the question, "are we consuming too much?" could be that we are indeed
consuming too much when consumption becomes an end to itself, that is,
when consumption is driven by social preferences, such as the attainment of
social status. As a growing body of literature shows, apart from our desire
for individually consumed goods, our choices are driven by the quest for
social status.
The present paper considers preferences that incorporate social status,
that is, individuals’ concerns about relative position (relative consumption),
leading to excess consumption. However, not every individual’s choices are
driven by social status; there exist individuals that care only about their
own private consumption. Since the share of each group in the total population determines the extent of overconsumption, we examine the evolution
of preferences through time by allowing individuals to alter their behavior
as a result of a learning process, akin to a replicator dynamics type. Given
that overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the main goal of
the paper is to examine the eﬀectiveness of environmental policy.
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More precisely, we assume that there are two groups of agents: those
that their preference has two components: a private utility component (depending on private consumption) and a social utility component (depending
on the average consumption of the entire population) and those that their
preference depend only on their own private consumption. Both types of
agents are influenced by a common externality, degradation of environmental quality, caused by consumption. We assume that agents can change type
and that their incentive to change type depends on the diﬀerence between
own and average payoﬀ. Furthermore, we assume that status seeking agents
have an additional incentive to change type when they receive information
about the detrimental eﬀects of pollution and overconsumption as a pollution driver. This informative advertisement is provided by the government
in an attempt to decrease the pollution externality, along with a tax on consumption. We consider the regulator’s choice of these two policy instruments
in the following two contexts: (i) using taxation and informative advertising
to attain a desired proportion of status seekers as a steady state outcome
by controlling the replicator dynamics equation (arbitrary overconsumption
control ), and (ii) using taxation and informative advertising to maximize a
welfare objective (optimal overconsumption control ). In the context of arbitrary overconsumption control we show that the regulator could decrease,
or even eliminate, the share of status seekers in the population by appropriately choosing the tax rate and informative advertisement. However, the
welfare properties of the arbitrary policy are not clear. In the context of
optimal overconsumption control, we show that a steady state exists and we
obtain some insights about optimal regulation by studying the steady states
through numerical simulations. The results of the simulations show that the
highest welfare is attained in the case that there are no status seekers, while
the lowest in the case that the entire population consists of status seekers.
The paper relates to the recent literature on the role of information provision to induce environmentally friendly behavior. The role of information
provision as a policy instrument to supplement environmental taxation has
been examined in a static framework in Petrakis et.al. (2005) and in a dynamic framework in Sartzetakis et.al. (2012). The information provided by
the government, through advertisements, shifts consumers towards less polluting alternatives, reducing the rate of the tax and improving welfare. The
literature has also examined information provision by environmental groups.
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For example,the role of information provided by environmental groups in
influencing firm’s choice of environmental quality is examined by Heijnen
(2012), and in inducing International Environmental Agreements by Hong
and Zhao (2014). More closely related to the present paper is Kallbekken
et.al. (2010), considering appeals to social norms as a policy instrument to
address consumption externalities. They find that when the existing norm
helps to shift consumption towards the socially optimal level of consumption, taxation welfare dominates appeals to social norms as a policy tool,
while when the norm shifts behavior away from what is socially optimal the
opposite is true.
Our paper is based on the theoretical and empirical literature supporting the Veblenian claim that individuals exhibit preferences for social status,
by linking individual preferences to average consumption. From this quite
large literature, credit should be given to the seminal contributions of Veblen
(1899) and Duesenberry (1949). A very good presentation of the main ideas
from sociology and their economic applications is given in Weiss and Fershtman’s (1998) survey of social status and economic performance. The role
of preferences for social status has been studied, relative to their eﬀect on
the allocation of resources by Fersthman and Weiss (1993), on savings and
the accumulation of human capital by Cole et al. (1992), and relatively to
their eﬀect on endogenous growth models by Corneo and Jeanne (1996) and
Rauscher (1996). Bernheim (1994) examines a model of social interaction
while Bisin and Verdier (1998) study the formation of preferences for ‘social
status’ as the result of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section lays
out the basic assumption on which our model is built. Section 3 presents
the optimal choices of the representative agents and Section 4 the replicator
dynamics. Section 5 examines the policy options and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
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The model

We assume that the total population consists of two types of agents. Type
2 agents’ utility depends only on private consumption while type 1 agents’
utility is influenced also by the average consumption of the total population.
For type 2 agents consumption is used as a devise to signal wealth and
3

improve social status. Acting in this manner type 2 agents consume too
much having a negative eﬀect on environmental quality , and thus we
call them non-environmentally friendly agents. We assume that the total
population of agents is , constant in time (without loss of generality), and
1 (), 2 () is the population of type 1 and type 2 agents respectively at
time . We also define () = 1() the fraction of type 1 agents and thus,
1 − () is the fraction of agents at type 2. Our working assumption is that
an agent may change type as an account of “learning” or as an account of
external control, imposed by a central planner.
Both types of agents are influenced by a common externality, this is the
degradation of environmental quality. Let  () be the pollution stock at
time . Assuming homogeneity in space, we assume that pollution depends
on the total consumption, in the sense that consumption activities and the
implied production to provide the consumption goods generate emission that
increase pollution. To simplify things we assume that emissions generated
per unit time due to consumption and related production process are proportional to total consumption. Assuming further a natural cleaning process
of the environment at the rate , pollution accumulation can be described
as:

= − () +  
(1)


where  is the total consumption from the population of agents and the
parameters    0 are constants related to the rate of natural decay of the
pollution stock and the eﬀect of total consumption on the total pollution
stock. Parameter  is a small positive number, that basically describes the
speed of the pollution accumulation process. The smaller  is, the faster
is the relaxation of the pollution stock to its steady state value. At the
limit  → 0 the pollution stock relaxes instantaneously to its steady state
 =  
We now consider the utility function of the two types of agents. The
utility function of agents of type 1 is of the form 1 (1  ̄;  ), i.e. depends
on consumption 1 , average consumption ̄ and the total pollution stock
1
 0, and decreasing in
 . The utility function 1 is increasing in 1 , 
1
1
 ,   0. Furthermore, following Bisin and Verdier (1998), we assume
that if the average consumption ̄ increases, type 1 agent’s utility decreases,
1
 0, and that the marginal utility of average consumption is increasing
 ̄

4

2

 1
in 1 , 
 0. These assumptions imply that the optimal choice of 1
1  ̄
is increasing in ̄, thus modelling a catching up with the Joneses eﬀect.
Finally, we assume that marginal utility of private consumption is more
sensitive to 1 than to ̄. In summary, type 1 agent’s behavior has the
following characteristics,

¯
¯ 2
¯ ¯
¯  1 ¯ ¯  2 1 ¯
1
1
1
 2 1
¯  (2)
¯
¯
¯
 0
 0
 0
 0 ¯

1

 ̄
1  ̄
1  ̄ ¯ ¯ 1 1 ¯

An example of such a type of utility functions can be the one provided by
Bisin-Verdier, which is of the general form 1 (1  ̄) = (1 ) + (1 − ̄)
where  is strictly increasing when 1 −̄   and constant otherwise, where
 is a critical value. The utility function  is a standard utility function.
Without loss of generality we may assume (0) = 0 so that 1 (1  1 ) =
(1 ).
The utility function of type 2 agents is of the form 2 (2 ;  ), i.e., depends
only on the agent’s private consumption 2 and the total pollution stock  .
Agents of type 2 are not influenced by their peers’ decisions. The function
2 is increasing in 2 and decreasing in  .

3

Optimal choices for the representative agent

Let us now consider the utility optimization problem for each type of representative agent, that will be used to determine their demand. The representative agent of type 1 at time  solves the maximization problem,
max 1 (1 ; ̄()  ()) +  subject to

(1 )

̄1 +  ≤ 1 
where  is a numeraire good, 1 is the income of the representative agent
of type 1, ̄ =  +  , where  is the price of the consumption good and  is
a tax imposed on the consumption good by a central planner in an attempt
to regulate pollution. By a standard Lagrange multipliers approach, this
becomes equivalent to solving,
max 1 (1 ; ̄  ) + (1 − ( +  )1 )
1
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where ̄ and  are externally given and treated as (time dependent) parameters. Define as,
¢
¡
1 () := 1∗ () = arg max 1 (1  ̄();  ()) + (1 − ( +  )1 ) 
1

the solution of the above maximization problem. This is the demand function for the consumption good of type 1 agents, which depends on the average consumption ̄() and the total pollution stock  () at time . Assuming
that interior solutions exist for this problem, we may implicitly determine
the demand of type 1 agents in terms of the algebraic equation,
1 (1  ̄;  )
− ( +  ) = 0
1
¡
¢
1∗ () = ∗1 ̄;    

(3)
(4)

This algebraic equation is assumed to hold for any . Furthermore, define
as,
1 () := 1 (1∗ () ̄();  ()) + (1 − ( +  )1∗ ())
¡
¢
= ∗1 ̄    

(5)

the indirect utility of the representative agent of type 1.
Similarly, at time , the representative agent of type 2, solves the maximization problem
max 2 (2 ;  ()) +  subject to

(2 )

( +  )2 +  ≤ 2 
where  is the numeraire good, 2 the income of type 2 agent and the
other parameters are defined as above. The above constrained maximization
problem becomes equivalent to,
max 2 (2 ;  ()) + (2 − ( +  )2 )
2

In a similar to type 1 agents’ case, we define as,
2 () := 2∗ () = arg max (2 (2 ;  ()) + (2 − ( +  )2 )) 
6

the solution of the above maximization problem. This is the demand function for the consumption good of type 2 agents, which depends on the total
pollution stock  () at time . The demand of type 2 agents is given by the
implicit, algebraic equation,
2 (2 ;  )
− ( +  ) = 0
2
2∗ () = ∗2 (   ) 

(6)

This algebraic equation is assumed to hold for any .
Furthermore, define as
2 () := 2 (2∗ ();  ()) + (2 − ( +  )2∗ ())
= ∗2 (   )

(7)

the indirect utility of the representative agent of type 2.
The total consumption at time  is then equal to  () = 1 ()1 () +
2 ()2 (), and the average consumption becomes
̄() = ()1∗ () + (1 − ())2∗ ()

(8)

Since 1∗ and 2∗ depend on ̄() and  (), which in turn depend on ̄(),
it is evident that (8) is to be considered as an implicit equation determining
the average consumption ̄() as a function of the price , the tax rate  ,
the fraction of type 1 agents , and time .

4

Replicator dynamics

We now allow agents to alter their behavior as a result of a learning process,
akin to a replicator dynamics type. We assume that at each time period,
each agent of either type learns the average payoﬀ of the total population,
̄ () := ()1 () + (1 − ())2 (), and compares her own payoﬀ, that is,
her indirect utility  (),  = 1 2, to ̄ (). We assume that the incentive of
each agent to change type depends on the diﬀerence between his own and
the average payoﬀ. For simplicity, we assume that the incentive for agent
1 to change type is simply proportional to the diﬀerence 1 () − ̄ () =
(1−())(1 ()−2 ()). The greater the diﬀerence between the two types of
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agents’ payoﬀs, the higher is the agent’s incentive to change her type. In this
context, agents’ behavior is chosen by imitation, and the type of behavior
leading to a higher payoﬀ is imitated in a manner that is proportional to
the payoﬀ diﬀerence (see Xepapadeas (2005) and Schlag (1998, 1999)).
Furthermore we assume that the government in an attempt to decrease
the pollution externality, apart from taxing consumption, provides informative advertising regarding the detrimental eﬀect of pollution and overconsumption as a pollution driver. The flow of informative advertising at time
 is  (). We assume that this information provides an additional incentive
to type 1 agents to change behavior. Information is eﬀective only if there
exists a positive number of environmentally aware agents, so that type 1
agents can associate the information to existing consumption behavior and
payoﬀ. According to the above discussion we assume that the rate of growth
of the share of type 1 agents in the total population is given by,
¡
¢
()
=  1 () − ̄ () − (1 −  ())  ( ())
 ()

= ()(1 − ())(1 () − 2 () −  ( ()))

(9)

where  () represents the incentive that informational advertisement provides to type 1 agents to change their behavior, with  (0) = 0 0  0
00 ≥ 0. If the share of type 2 in the population, which is (1 −  ()) is
not zero, then a positive flow of information will reduce the share of type
1 in the total population. This means that if some non status seekers exist
then a flow of informative advertising will turn some status seekers into non
status seekers. If everybody is a status seeker then informative advertising
will have no impact.
As it was mentioned above, we assume a simple proportional eﬀect of the
utility diﬀerence, where  is a positive parameter. The utility gap incentive
1 () − ̄ () indicates that if the indirect utility of type 1 is less than the
average utility the share of type 1 population will be reduced.
Note that (9) is deceptively simple, since the term 1 () − 2 () depends
on (), through the dependence of ̄() on () via (8). Using the definitions
of 1 (), 2 (), and ̄(), from (5), (7) and (8) respectively, and setting,
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without loss of generality,  = 1, the replicator dynamics equation is,
·

 = (1 − ) [1 (    ) − 2 (    ) −  ()] 

(10)

where the stock of pollution is defined in (1).

5

Regulation

Consider now a regulator who is concerned with the environmental aspect of
overconsumption. The regulator’s policy instruments are the emissions tax
 () and the flow of informative advertising  ()  Regarding policy schemes
we consider the case where the regulator has two options:
1. To use taxation and informative advertising to attain a desired proportion of status seekers as a steady state outcome by controlling the replicator
dynamics equation. E.g. lim→∞  () = 0 that is none is a status seeker, or
lim→∞  () = ∗ ∈ (0 1)  which implies that a polymorphic population of
status seekers and non-status seekers is attained in the long run. We define
this approach as arbitrary overconsumption control.
2. To use taxation and informative advertising to maximize a welfare
objective. In this case the regulator chooses the optimal paths for taxes
 ()  and the flow of informational advertising  () in order to maximize
discounted welfare subject to replicator dynamics constraint and the steady
state proportion of status seekers is the outcome of the optimization process.
We define this approach as optimal overconsumption control.
The replicator dynamics equation which is the basis for arbitrary or
optimal control of overconsumption is given by (10). In order to attain
tractable results, we consider the case where the pollution dynamics are
relatively faster than the status dynamics. By taking the limit as  → 0 in
(1), which implies instantaneous relaxation to the steady state, the pollution
path is given by1
 () =


 () with  = ̄


(11)

Thus, we can write,
 () =  ̄ ()   =
1





(12)

This assumption does aﬀect the results regarding the structure and the eﬃciency of
the policies, arbitrary or optimal, chosen by the regulator.
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Furthermore we assume the following specific functional form for each of
the two type of agents’ utility,
1
1
1
1 (1  ̄  ) = 1 − 12 + (1 − ̄) − (1 − ̄)2 − 1  2 
2
2
2
1 2 1
2
2 (2   ) = 2 − 2 − 2  
2
2

(13)
(14)

where   0 is a parameter indicating the relative influence of status seeking
in type 1 agent’s utility and   0 indicates each type of agents’ perception
2
1
 0 we need 2  1 and for 
 0
of pollution damage. Note that for 
2
1

we need 1  1 + 1+ ̄. The above specification satisfies the Bisin-Verdier
1

conditions provided in (2) since, 
 = −   0,  ̄ = −+(1¯− ̄) ¯ 0,
¯  2 1 ¯
 2 1
which implies (given   0) that 1 − ̄  1, 
=   0, and ¯ 
¯

̄
1
1  ̄
¯ 2
¯
¯  1 ¯
¯ 1 1 ¯ since   1 + .
Using the above preferences’ specification we derive the optimal consumption choice for each type of agents,

2 () := 2∗ () = 1 − ̄ = b
1 () := 1∗ () =

1 +  − ̄ + ̄

1+

(15)
(16)

The average consumption is,
̄ = b +



1 +  − 

(17)

Substituting ̄ from above into (16) yields,
1 () := 1∗ () = b + 1 ()

(18)


where 1 () = 1+−
.
Substituting (18), (15), (12) and (17) into (13) and (14), yields the indirect utility functions of the two types of agents.

1
(1 − 1 ) b2 − 21 1 ()b
 + 1 () − 1 2 1 ()2 + 
2
1
 − 2 2 1 ()2 + 
2 = (1 − 2 ) b2 − 22 1 ()b
2
1 =

10

(19)
(20)

n
³
´o
where 1 () = 1 () − 12() + (1 − ) 1 − (1 − ) 12()
and  = (12)  2  ,
 = 1 2. Note that we assume that both type of agents have the same income
 , so that our outcome does not depend on income distribution.

5.1

Arbitrary overconsumption control

When the regulator exercises arbitrary control, the objective is to choose
policy instruments  and  to steer the replicator dynamics equation (10)
to a desired steady state.
The replicator dynamics equation (10) has two steady states at the
boundaries ∗0 = 0, ∗1 = 1 and possibly interior steady states if for the
given choice of   there exist
∗ ∈ (0 1) : (1 (∗   ) − 2 (∗   ) −  () = 0
The local stability properties of a steady state depend on the sign of the
derivative
¯
 0 Local stability
̇ ¯¯
¯
 =∗ =01  0 Local instability


When  and  are used as controls the controlled replicator dynamics equation becomes. Substituting (19) and (20) into (10) the controlled
replicator dynamics equation becomes,
£ 2
¤
·
 = () b
 + 21 ()b
 + 2 () −  

(21)

where,  = 2 − 1  0, since type 2 agents are assumed environmentally
aware, () = (1 − ),  = () and


1+−
µ
¶¾
½
1 ()
1 ()
1 () := 1 () −
+ (1 − ) 1 −
(1 − )

2
2

1 () :=

(22)

2 () := 1 () + 2 1 ()2 

(23)

The replicator dynamics always has two fixed points, the  = 0 and the
 = 1 solutions. The  = 0 corresponds to the whole population consisting
of type 2 agents, while  = 1 corresponds to the whole population being
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agents of type 1. There is the possibility of more fixed points , defined by
the solution of the algebraic equation,
() := b
2 + 21 ()b
 + 2 () −  = 0

(24)

Thus the regulator may be able, by choosing  and , to steer the system
to a steady-state monomorphic population  = 0 or  = 1, or to a steadystate polymorphic population ∗ which is determined by (24). To obtain a
clear picture of the possible outcomes we run numerical simulations.
Assuming the following parametrization
 +  = 05  = 05  = 3;  = 1; 1 = 050; 2 = 06  = 100

(25)

the regulator can attain a stable polymorphic steady state at ∗ = 0492.
This means that if the cost of the consumption good, including the tax, is
05 and the flow of informative advertisement is fixed at  = 05, then at
the steady state 492% of the population will be status seekers. This shown
in figure (1).

Figure 1: Stable polymorphic steady state
The polymorphic steady state is stable, as indicated by the negative
slope, of the phase diagram at the steady state ∗ = 0492. This suggest
that the monomorphic steady states are unstable.2 Therefore for the given
parametrization and arbitrary controls, irrespective of the initial proportion
2

This is indicated by the positive slope of the phase diagram at the steady states
 = 0  = 1
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of status seekers their long run equilibrium proportion in the population will
be 492%.
If the weight  associated the relative influence of status seeking in type
1 agent’s utility is reduced to  = 175, with all other parameters the same,
then the share of the status seekers in the population is reduced to 924%.
An increase of informative advertisement to  = 2, with everything else
kept at the initial levels (25), will produce at the steady state a monomorphic
population without any status seekers. This steady state is stable, while the
steady state where everybody is a status seeker ( = 1) is unstable. This is
shown in figure (2).

Figure 2: Monomorphic steady state without any status seekers
Furthermore an increase in tax to  +  = 08, while keeping the level of
informative advertisement at the relatively lower level of  = 1 and everything else at the initial levels (25), will produce a steady state of status
seekers of 128%.
Thus, an increase in the tax rate or informative advertisement will reduce, or even eliminate the share of status seekers in the population. Although this type of regulation can control for overconsumption and the associated environmental externality, the welfare properties of the arbitrary
policy are far from being clear. This is because the reduction of the status seekers’ share in the pollution will tend to increase welfare, but on the
other hand the cost of taxation, in terms of consumer surplus, and the cost
of providing informative advertisement will tend to reduce welfare. A bal13

ance between welfare gains and loses from regulation can be achieved by a
regulator following optimal policies.

5.2

Optimal overconsumption control

The regulator, in this case, chooses paths for  () and  () that will optimize
discounted social welfare. The instantaneous social welfare can be expressed
as,
¡
¢
 () =  () 1 ̄    + (1 −  ()) 2 (   ) −  ( ()) 

(26)

where  ( ()) is the cost of information provision  at time  and  () and
 () are given by (12) and (10) respectively.
The problem to be solved is,
max

Z

∞

 ()() 0

−  ()

subject to
·

 = (1 − ) [1 (    ) − 2 (    ) −  ()]
 () =  ̄ () 
Using the our specification for the utility function, he optimal control
problem is,
max

Z

 ()() 0

∞

−



µ
¶
1 2
()1 + (1 − ()2 ) −  
2

subject to
£ 2
¤
·
 = () b
 + 21 ()b
 + 2 () −  

where 12 2 denotes the cost of providing informative advertisement  (),
and 1 (), 2 () are defined in (22),(23). The current value Hamiltonian
of the above problem is,
1
H =1 ( )b
2 + 2 ( )b
 + 3 ( ) − − 2 + 4 ( )
2
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where,
1 ( ) := 1 () + 2()
2 ( ) := 2 () + 2()1 ()
3 ( ) := −()
4 ( ) := 3 () + ()2 ()

1 () = 2 − 22 + 1
2 () = 21 ()( − 2 )

3 () = 1 () + 2 1 ()2 ( − 2 ) + 

The maximum principle implies the following controls in a feedback form,
2 ( )

1 ( )

(27)

1
 = 3 ( )


(28)

̂ = −

Then the maximized Hamiltonian is defined as,
 ∗ ( ) = 4 ( ) −

1
2 ( )2
+ 3 ( )2 
21 ( ) 2

(29)

To obtain a tractable approximation of the maximized Hamiltonian (29)
we expand it around  = 0 to obtain the first order contribution to the
Hamiltonian3 , 0∗ . Setting ̄ = () and recalling that () = (1 − ),
the maximized Hamiltonian takes the form:
1 2
̄ + 1 ()2 (0 + 1  + 2 2 )̄
2
1
1 ()2 (0 + 1  + 2 2 + 3 3 )
+ 2
2 (22 − 1)

0∗ ( ̄) =

3

(30)

The approximate Hamiltonian is:

 ∗ ( ̄) = 0∗ ( ̄) + 1∗ ( ̄)


2 ()(2 () − 21 ()1 ()
2 ()2
1 2
̄ + 2 ()̄ + 3 () −
+
̄
=
2
21 ()
1 ()2
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where,
0 = 1 + 
1 = −2(1 + )
2 =  + 2
and,
0 = 2 ∗ ( + 1)2 (22 − 1)
1 = − ∗  ∗ (22 − 1)( + 1)(4 − )

2 = 22 (1 +  − 2 (1 − 2 + 2) − )

3 = 3 (22 − 1)

Using (30) the Hamiltonian system becomes:
̇ =  −
̇ =

0∗


0∗



(31)
(32)

where the costate variable  can be interpreted as the shadow value of having
a 1% change in the proportion of status seekers in the population. If  
0 having an increase in the status seekers is a cost in terms of welfare.
Solving the Hamiltonian system (31), (32) with an initial condition for the
proportion of status seekers  (0) = 0 and the transversality condition at
infinity lim→∞ e−  ()  () = 0, yields the optimal paths for ∗ () and
∗ (). Substitution of (∗ ()   ∗ ()) into (27), (28), provides the optimal
controls either in feedback or open loop form. These controls will constitute
the optimal regulation for controlling overconsumption and the resulting
environmental externality.
A steady state for the proportion of status seekers and its shadow value

16

is a point ( ∗  ∗ ) such that
©
ª
1
0 = −  0 ()2 − 2 () 0 () + 20 ()()  −  0 () + 

1
0 = ()2  + 2 ()()

where,
1
1 ()2 (0 + 1  + 2 2 + 3 3 )
 () := 2
2 (22 − 1)

(33)
(34)
(35)

Monomorphic steady states for the proportion of status seekers  emerge
at the boundaries  = 0,  = 1, since () =  (1 − ), while a polymorphic
steady state may emerge at the interior, i.e., ∗ ∈ (0 1).
The stability properties of a steady state are determined by the Jacobian
determinant evaluated at the steady state,
=

Ã

 ̇

 ̇


 ̇

 ̇


!



We can obtain some insights about optimal regulation by studying the steady
states through numerical simulations.
Using the same parametrization as in (25), with  = 1 and  = 003 the
optimal steady state is ∗ = 0436989,  ∗ = −267587 with corresponding
steady-state optimal controls ( +  )∗ = 033, ∗ = 066 and welfare  ∗ =
332899 The shadow value of  is negative indicating that an increase in the
share of status seekers at the optimal steady state creates welfare cost. Note
that with arbitrary control a steady state of ∗ = 0492 was attained with
 +  = 05,  = 05. Thus it could be argued that the regulator can obtain
an almost equal division of the population, obtaining higher welfare by using
more invormative advertisement relative to taxation. The optimal steady
state is a saddle point, as expected, with the phase diagram presented in
figure (3).
The stable manifold has a negative slope at the steady state. In terms
of regulation, this means that for an initial proportion of status seekers
around 437%, the regulator should choose initial value for the shadow value
 (0) so that the system starts on the stable manifold. Given this choice of
( (0)   (0)) the initial values of the controls are fully determined through
(27), (28), so that the resulting paths of the optimal controls will attain the
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Figure 3: Phase diagram of the optimal polymorphic steady state
optimal path of status seekers ∗ ()  with lim→∞ ∗ () = 0436989
To examine the sensitivity of the solution to the cost of advertisement,
we increase  to 10. The resulting optimal steady state is ∗ = 0623616,
∗ = −587308, ( +  )∗ = 003, ∗ = 013,  ∗ = 331179. Thus an increase
in the cost of advertisement will increase the share of status seekers and
reduce welfare. It is interesting that the tax rate is not increased but is
reduced. This suggest that taxes and informative advertisement might not
always be substitutes.
A reduction of  to  = 02, with all other parameters kept at there initial
value, reduces as expected, the share of status seekers at the optimal steady
state to ∗ = 0183, and increase welfare to  ∗ = 333337. This steady
state has the saddle point property.
For the monomorphic steady states we need to notice that the following
conditions hold:
No status seekers, ∗ = 0
−2
finite
(∗   ∗ ) = (0 0 ) with 0 = (2 −2−2)
 ( ) ' 0 ̂ ( ) ' −
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2 (0)
2 (0 )
=−
=0
1 (0 )
1 (0)

The eigenvalues at the steady state are :
(0)

1 =

2
−2 + 2 + 2
(0)
 2 =
2 + 2
2 + 2

(36)

This means that we have a saddle point for large  and small , or
unstable for small  The steady state welfare is, 0∗ = 1 .
Using  = 1,  = 003,  = 3 we obtain ∗0 = 0, 0∗ = −10274,
( +  )∗ = 0, ∗ = 0, 0∗ = 333333 The steady state is a saddle point saddle point. In order to compare the steady state welfare with the corresponding polymorphic steady state recall that, ∗ = 0436989,  ∗ = −267587,
 ∗ = 332899. Thus on welfare grounds it seems preferable to attain the
monomorphic steady state.4
Everybody is a status seeker, ∗ = 1
Using  = 1,  = 003,  = 3 we obtain ∗ = 1,  ∗ = 192073,
( +  )∗ = 7, ∗ = 0, 1∗ = 283333 The monomorphic steady state is
a saddle point, but is clearly inferior on welfare grounds to the polymorphic
and the monomorphic ∗ = 0 steady states.
It should be noted that when  is reduced to  = 02 both monomorphic
steady states are unstable. In this case the polymorphic steady state shown
in figure (4) is globally stable in [0 1] and the design of optimal regulation
is straightforward.
The results of the above simulations, using the same parameter values,
show that the highest welfare is attained in the case that there are no status
seekers, while the lowest in the case that the entire population consists of
status seekers. The polymorphic steady state with 43 7% status seekers
yields welfare that is below the case that status seekers are eliminated and
above the case that there are only status seekers.

6

Conclusions

We develop a model incorporating preferences for social status and we assume that there are two groups of individuals, those that overconsume in
their eﬀort to establish their social status and those that care only about
the intrinsic value of their consumption and thus are more environmentally
4
The way that regulation should be designed depends however on the structure of the
stable manifolds associated with the two steady states, which requires further research.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram of the optimal monomorphic steady state
friendly. We examine the evolution of preferences through time by allowing
individuals to alter their behavior as a result of a learning process that is
influenced by informative advertisement provided by the government. We
consider the regulator’s choice of informative advertisement and environmental taxation within two diﬀerent contexts: (i)arbitrary overconsumption
control, and (ii) optimal overconsumption control. In the context of arbitrary
overconsumption control we show that the regulator could decrease, or even
eliminate, the share of status seekers in the population by appropriately
choosing the tax rate and informative advertisement. However, the welfare
properties of the arbitrary policy far from being clear. In the context of
optimal overconsumption control, we show that a steady state exists and we
obtain some insights about optimal regulation by studying the steady states
through numerical simulations. The results of the simulations show that the
highest welfare is attained in the case that there are no status seekers, while
the lowest in the case that the entire population consists of status seekers.
Since we made a number of simplifying assumption in order to attain the
above results, further research is required to establish these results in a more
general context.
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